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Abstract 
When co-operatives were first invented, it was assumed their membership 
would be limited to one type of user. The Rochdale Pioneers favoured 
consumers, and employee representation was deliberately limited to a set 
percentage of board members. Similarly, Schulze Delitsch and Raiffeisen 
privileged farmers, Buchez workers, insurance mutuals those who are insured, 
and so on. Recently, Italian social co-operatives have developed a different model 
in which all the relevant stakeholders become members: those who are cared 
for, the carers, the workers, and volunteers. Also, occasionally dual stakeholder 
co-operatives have been designed. Eroski, the big retailer located in the Iberian 
peninsula, has both consumers and workers in membership, and iCoop in Korea 
has both consumers and farmers. This paper has two aims, to set out some of the 
theoretical arguments for and against multi-stakeholder governance, to look at 
examples of multi-stakeholder models in practice, and to generate from this a set 
of research questions.  
  
Introduction 
When co-operatives were first invented, it was assumed their membership 
would be limited to one type of user. The Rochdale Pioneers favoured 
consumers, and employee representation was deliberately limited to a set 
percentage of board members. Similarly, Schulze Delitsch and Raiffeisen 
privileged farmers, Buchez workers, and so on. It is true that before these 
familiar types of co-operation crystallised there was a period of idealism, when 
utopian socialists such as Robert Owen and Charles Fourier were advocating a 
co-operative community in which membership would be much more holistic. 
Their vision did not survive much contact with reality, whereas co-operative 
stores for consumers prospered. There was also sometimes a period of 
confusion, when promoters were unsure about which stakeholder to put at the 
centre of the co-operative. William King set up co-operative stores that were 
both consumer and producer owned (with artisans bringing goods to sell 
through them), until it was realised that their interests could clash (Birchall, 
1994). Raiffeisen set up rural banks in which investors had control, until he 
realised that they had to be owned by the farmers (Birchall, 2013). The 
emergence of single stakeholder co-operatives could be seen as a process of 
organisational evolution; every other type failed to survive and reproduce itself 
over time.  
The assumption that co-operatives should give membership to a single-
stakeholder continues in the rules that they develop to prevent multi-
stakeholding emerging. For instance, quite soon in their evolution, consumer co-
operatives began to limit the number of employees who could be elected to a 
board. Furthermore, membership was seen as being for consumers, and 
employee board members had to see themselves primarily as representing 
consumers. Another example is insurance mutuals that, though they began to 
appoint experts to their boards, established a tradition that a majority of board 
members should represent policy-holders (Birchall, 2011, Ch.1). Housing co-
operatives have also developed rules that ensure a majority of residents on their 
boards. Some farmer co-operatives have recently appointed one or two experts 
to their boards, but others are resisting the idea (Birchall, 2014).  
Why, then, should we want to discuss the idea of multi-stakeholder ownership 
and governance of co-operatives? It is because practices are changing. 
Occasionally dual stakeholder co-operatives have been designed. The Spanish 
health co-operative Espriu has both doctors and patients on some of its boards, 
Eroski, the big Spanish retailer, has both consumers and workers in membership, 
and iCoop in Korea has both consumers and farmers. Recently, Italian social co-
operatives have developed a governance model in which membership is open to 
more than one of the relevant stakeholders. Practice varies, but membership is 
open to some combination of workers, volunteers, other non-profit organisations 
and service users. The social co-operative sector is growing and being copied 
elsewhere. However, it operates typically in social care services where non-
profits have traditionally provided services under contract to local authorities, 
and so it may or may not have more general applicability.  
This paper has three aims: to set out some of the theoretical arguments for and 
against multi-stakeholder governance, to describe some examples of multi-
stakeholder models in practice, and to generate from this a set of research 
questions.  
Economic theory and the assumption of single-stakeholder ownership 
Mainstream economic theory lends weight to the argument that multi-
stakeholder ownership will not work. In a small business where the owners 
carry out the tasks of management and oversight themselves, there is no need 
for a separate governance function. As soon as they appoint a separate group of 
managers to run the business, the problem emerges of how the principals (the 
owners) can control the agents (the managers) so that their interests are aligned 
and managers do not engage in ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour. Governance is seen as a 
cost to the business rather than an activity that adds value. Transaction cost 
economics adds to this analysis with two propositions. First, if giving ownership 
rights to a particular stakeholder group leads to high cost of governance 
compared with those of their competitors, the business will suffer. If a change of 
ownership type reduces such costs, then eventually (other things being equal) it 
will be chosen. Conversions - such as from consumer to investor ownership, or 
from investor-ownership to employee ownership - can be explained in this way.  
Second, there are also costs from not bringing a particular stakeholder group 
into ownership. If their co-operation is needed by the business it is secured 
through contracts the cost of which is determined through the market. For 
instance, the conventional capitalist solution is to have investor-owners and to 
contract with employees through paying them wages. However, there are 
circumstances where other type of ownership will be promoted. For instance, if 
an industry is prone to monopoly over crucial parts of the value chain, producer-
ownership will prove more attractive than investor-ownership. This explains the 
popularity of farmer co-operatives (Hansmann, 1996).  
What economic theory does not predict – in fact, does not even consider – is the 
possibility that more than one stakeholder group could take ownership (Borzaga 
and Sacchetti, 2015). It is assumed that stakeholder groups have essentially 
different interests that can only be brought into alignment through market 
contracting. If they are brought into ownership, then their interests have to be 
aligned through the system of governance. Since the costs of such governance 
will be too high (relative to competitors who do not need to incur such costs), 
the business will suffer.  
A strong argument for multi-stakeholder co-operatives 
Shann Turnbull has developed a strong argument for joint ownership by 
employees, consumers and suppliers. Such a co-operative would have three 
separate boards to represent these interest groups, and they would together 
make up a compound board. He calls this ‘distributed control’.  
His argument against single-stakeholder ownership has three parts. First, 
centralised control is corrupting. Directors have too much power to maintain 
their positions while obtaining private benefits for themselves. Second, there is a 
lack of information by which board members can challenge the status quo. There 
is a lack of independent feedback information on performance. Directors become 
‘largely captive to the information provided by management’ (Turnbull, 2001 
p178). Third, there is information overload, which means that directors cannot 
effectively process the information they need.  
All these criticisms of unitary boards are familiar and we do not need much 
convincing of their merit. However, the mainstream literature on governance 
also sets out to tackle these problems, seeing them not as inherent to unitary 
governance but as faults that can be rectified. What Turnbull advocates is a 
complete redesign of businesses and we need to be convinced that his solution 
does not just produce another set of problems. At the heart of his solution is the 
introduction of greater complexity into the governance system, with boards 
being accountable to a higher authority that contains all the stakeholder 
interests. This is variously known as a supervisory board, stakeholder council, or 
watchdog board. Of course, this kind of design is also common in single 
stakeholder co-operatives. Multi-stakeholding adds the challenge of reconciling 
diverse interests before they reach the main board as well as enabling them to 
come together again at a higher level to supervise the board. 
There remains the question of how the interests of such a diverse group of 
owners can be reconciled. Much of the time they will have a common interest in 
the effective running of the business, but there must be moments when they 
have to decide who gets what from the value added. They cannot all benefit 
equally or all the time, nor can they always be expected to agree on what is fair.  
Another issue concerns the examples that are given of distributed ownership in 
practice. Turnbull lists the Japanese Keiretsu, employee-owned firms and the 
Mondragon co-operatives. The Keiretsu are a good example; here the firm 
distributes shares to employees and suppliers in order to bind them into the 
business. It could be described as ‘distributive capitalism’ in that it widens the 
ownership of firms. Also, because firms invest in each other, it creates an 
informal business network. What is unclear is whether employees benefit from 
increased authority in the governance structure; this would depend on the 
extent of their shareholding in any one firm and on whether they are 
incentivised to make the most of this.  
Employee-owned firms are not a good example of multi-stakeholding as they are 
either single-stakeholder co-operatives (if 100% owned by employees) or 
hybrids (if majority owned by employees along with other investors). A firm that 
is owned by a combination of workers and investors is a kind of multi-
stakeholding or at least ‘dual stakeholding’, but some commentators see this as 
an unstable mix that should be encouraged to lead to full employee-ownership 
(Ellerman, 1990).  
There are other examples of producer co-operative hybrids. Some food 
processing companies are now owned by a mix of farmers and outside investors. 
Kerry Group is a good example, though the farmer stakeholding has fallen 
recently to just over 13%. Other food processing companies are majority owned 
by farmers (Emmi in Switzerland is a good example), but in some cases the 
farmers have bought back their side of the business because they do not like 
sharing control with other investors. In Ireland, Lakeland Co-operative and 
Glanbia Co-operative have succeeded in buying back their dairying business. The 
only strong argument for a mix of producer and investor ownership is the need 
for more capital that outside shareholders can provide (Briscoe et al, 2012). 
The Mondragon system looks at first sight to be another weak example of multi-
stakeholding. At the level of the individual co-operative, most are still 
conventionally owned either by workers, consumers or farmers. However, at the 
higher level, of the Corporation, there are elaborate governance mechanisms for 
ensuring the different types of co-operative are represented. Also at Mondragon 
there is one genuine worker and consumer owned retailer in the Group, Eroski 
(the Spanish co-operative retailer, Consum, has a similar ownership structure).  
There are a few other interesting examples of multi-stakeholder ownership that 
might support Turnbull’s argument. iCoop is a very successful consumer-farmer 
owned co-operative federation in Korea which we will examine in more detail 
below. There are two health co-operative federations that have both producers 
(medical doctors) and consumers (people insured through health plans) on some 
of their boards; Unimed in Brazil, and Espriu in Spain (Birchall, 2014 ch.6). 
However, in both these cases the producer interest predominates. A cynical view 
might be that the development of health plans is a way that medical doctors can 
gain business for themselves, and that having some consumers on the board is a 
necessary part of their legitimation. In practice, though, there is no reason for 
such cynicism; the common interest of both producer and consumer in having an 
effective health care system does seem to hold them together. On the other hand, 
the dominance of the medical interest is evidenced by the fact that government 
legislation has also been necessary to ensure the consumer interest is properly 
safeguarded in the governance of their health insurance mutuals.  
We will now look further at two clear examples of multi-stakeholding - Eroski 
and iCoop – before examining in some detail the most well known example of the 
Italian social co-operatives.  
 
The examples of Eroski and ICoop 
 
Eroski is a supermarket chain that began in 1969 in the Basque region, with the 
merger of 10 consumer co-operatives, but has now spread out into other parts of 
Spain and France. It is a highly successful business, with 1896 stores (including 
supermarkets, super stores, cash & carry, opticians, travel agents, perfume stores 
and sports shops) and an annual turnover of more than €6 billions (Eroski, 
2015).  It has 33,509 employees and over seven million customer members, and 
is a member of the Mondragon Corporation.  
Eroski’s governance system is a hybrid of the Mondragon worker ownership 
system and of a conventional consumer co-operative; it describes itself as a 
consumer co-operative in which the workers are owners and the consumers are 
members. However, in order to become an owner an employee has to invest a 
significant amount in the co-operative; only 11,858 are ‘worker partners’ out of a 
total of 33,509 workers. The ‘client partners’ are a much higher proportion of the 
customers, accounting for 76% of sales. The incentives are very different: 
worker-owners share 40 percent of the profits, while consumer members 
receive discounts on purchases.  
The annual general meeting consists of 250 worker and 250 consumer 
representatives, who then elect a governing board of six worker and six 
consumer partners. This governance system is supplemented by worker self-
management in the stores and by 21 consumerist committees that provide 
guidelines for the co-operative. It is interesting that the president of the co-
operative has to be a consumer rather than a worker member; anecdotally, the 
view of commentators who know the business is that the worker interest tends 
to dominate. This is only to be expected, since the workers have a much larger 
stake in the business, both as employees and as shareholders.  
iCoop is also a successful retailer, with 180 stores and 17 factories for farm 
produce. At first sight, it is a similar mix of consumer and producer ownership 
(the producers being local farmers). Its 2015 annual report says it has 237,000 
consumers and 2367 producers in membership. However, it is not a primary but 
a secondary co-operative; the individual consumers and workers are grouped in 
85 consumer and 33 producer co-operatives. It puts the emphasis on the 
consumption side of the equation, describing itself as a ‘consumer co-operative 
federation’ of ‘consumer members who practice ethical consumption and 
production with producers’ (iCoop, 2015). It owns a Mutual Aid Society for 
Enhancing Korean Agriculture that has business with consumers, producers and 
employees, but this is an insurance mutual so that its customers are all simply 
insured persons. The farmers are grouped into an association of producer 
groups.  
The problem of how to reach a price for products is therefore solved within the 
market. The federation supplements this with a member account fund in which 
consumers make advance payments so that farmers can grow their produce 
without having to go into debt. It also has a price stabilisation fund that 
intervenes to smooth out farm prices over the year. The federation enables a 
genuine solidarity to be expressed between consumers and producers, but it 
keeps them separate so that their interests do not have to be completely 
reconciled.  
The Italian model of social co-operatives 
 
Organisations that provide social care for vulnerable people have a particular 
problem. Those who they are caring for include people with learning difficulties, 
people who are physically or mentally disabled, older people suffering from 
dementia and so on. They cannot always be relied on to look after their own 
interests either as purchasers of care or within the governance system of the co-
operative. In economic theory, we might say the costs of both contracting and of 
governance are too high. This problem was analysed by Hansmann (1996), who 
recognised a dilemma. On the one hand agency costs would be exceptional if 
users had to own the firm. On the other hand, there would be a clear 
disadvantage from being excluded. Hansmann’s solution is that the organisation 
should be constituted as a non-profit in which nobody owns the enterprise and a 
board of trustees provides its governance. The trustees are trusted to act on 
behalf of the service users.  
A different governance solution is exemplified by the social cooperative model, 
which has developed in Italy since its inception in 1991 (Law 381/1991). This 
model was explicitly engineered to be multi-stakeholder. Here the service users 
have the right to be part of the assembly of members and represented in the 
governance structure along with all the other main stakeholders: workers, 
volunteers, carers, other legal entities such as co-operatives and financial 
members. Multistakeholding requires specific governance solutions and has 
implications for governance costs (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014). At the same time, 
however, it enables the inclusion of a plurality of interests which can lower the 
costs of coordinating transactions on the market (borne by the internal patrons), 
but also the external costs associated with the exclusion of stakeholders from the 
governance process (borne by excluded stakeholders) (Borzaga and Sacchetti, 
2015). 
For the law: 
“Social cooperatives are intended to pursue the general interest of the 
community to human promotion and social integration of citizens through: 
A) the management of social, health and educational services [Type A] 
B) carrying out various activities - agricultural, industrial, commercial or 
services - aimed at providing employment for disadvantaged persons. [Type B]  
(Parlamento Italiano, L. 381/1991; Art. 1)1 
                                                        
1 translated by the author; specifications in brackets [Type A] [Type B] are added by 
the author; see Thomas, 2004, for more details on Types A and B). 
Together, the differentiation between Type A and Type B introduced by the 1991 
law has facilitated the organisation of systemic solutions to welfare problems. 
Consortia or groups including Type A and Type B cooperatives address a variety 
of complementary societal goals, from elderly care, to housing, to rehabilitation 
of psychiatric patients (Type A social cooperatives), as well as work integration 
in manufacturing, agriculture, and service activities (Type B social cooperatives)  
The objective of social cooperatives was to produce welfare services, support 
employment and, more generally, to produce meritorious goods (Bacchiega and 
Borzaga, 2001; Weisbrod, 1988).  Specialized welfare services and work 
integration can be considered an example of meritorious goods that can lead to 
the reduction of social marginalisation. Moreover, because of their “public” aims, 
social cooperatives have grown to represent specific forms of social enterprise 
which, in the European tradition places emphasis on social aims, participatory 
governance, and limited profit distribution (Cf. European Parliament, 2012). 
Democratic membership embodies the participatory requirement, while 
commercial goals are instrumental to the pursuit of social aims. This emphasis 
on participatory governance has deep roots in the country’s cooperative 
tradition that had already developed in social service provision prior to the law, 
as well as in other sectors, such as farming, banking, manufacturing, and 
retailing.  
Moreover, the idea of stakeholder participation was supported by the broader 
framework set by the Civil Code (art. 2540 and 2542), which regulates 
representation either through the Board of Directors or by the institution of 
multiple Assemblies for each of the stakeholders. 
 
Does this mean that in practice all stakeholders have equal authority within the 
governance structure? Not necessarily. It is, in fact, recognised that in Type A co-
ops the worker interest tends to be dominant. One interesting question is how a 
model with a prevalence of worker membership sets out to pursue the interest of 
users, typically disadvantaged categories of individuals. Social cooperative 
membership, in fact, has mainly included workers, volunteers and, less 
frequently, other non-profit organisations,2 whilst users have been scarcely 
represented, especially in Type A cooperatives. So, differently from ordinary co-
ops, Type A, and to some extent Type B, social cooperatives cannot be considered 
mutual organisations, since their activities are directed towards the benefit of 
users rather than the co-op’s main patron (cf. Cafaggi and Iamiceli, 2009).  
Type A cooperative statutes tend to emphasise community welfare objectives to 
be pursued in partnership with public and private organizations. Stakeholders 
retain control through the Assembly, have the right to elect directors and, 
indirectly, the board president.  
Having analysed a number of Type A social cooperatives,3 a possible answer to 
the question of why workers would pursue users’ interests is that although, as a 
norm, beneficiaries are not members, their welfare is nonetheless the sine qua 
non condition for the existence of the cooperative. Because of the social nature 
and aims of the cooperative project, worker members understand that their 
authority is legitimised only if it is instrumental to the benefit of vulnerable 
categories. In other words, there is a “social contract” that ties controlling publics 
(mostly workers, often paired by volunteers) with non-controlling publics 
(beneficiaries).4 
The answer is different for Type B cooperatives. Type B cooperatives focus on 
work-integration and strive to develop work opportunities at the best possible 
conditions for all worker members, including users. In Type B cooperatives 
beneficiaries of work-integration services should preferably be members (albeit 
not necessarily). In fact, when hired by a Type B cooperative, users can become 
worker members with the same statutory rights of other ordinary worker 
members. Where this happens systematically, it represents a way to make users 
part of the governance structure. Thus, the welfare of ordinary workers is 
inexorably related to the presence and welfare of workers with difficulties, since 
                                                        
2 The Assembly works with the one-head-one vote rule, with the exception of members with the 
status of legal entities (which can express up to five votes), and financial organisations. For the 
latter, votes cannot go over one third of those attributed to ordinary members, and nomination 
rights in the Board of Directors are limited to less than one third (for detailed analysis of the 
Italian legislation, cf. Cafaggi and Iamiceli, 2009). 
3 See Sacchetti and Tortia (2014); Sacchetti (2016) for illustrative cases. 
4 On social contract, see Brummer, 1991; Donaldson, 1982; Flanningan, 1989; Sacconi, 2013. 
these cooperatives find their reason to exist only if they succeed in integrating 
user-workers (by law with a proportion of 30:70). With this member 
composition, directors and managers must be clear about their duty, which is 
simultaneously to maximise the welfare of both type of workers.  
In 2006 another piece of legislation instituted the social enterprise model. With 
the new regulation, the social cooperative form defined in 1991 became just one 
organisational model among others (including also associations, foundations and 
other than cooperative businesses). The social enterprise regulation interpreted 
the participatory governance criterion by requiring openness in the selection of 
stakeholder members. There are no specific prescriptions on who the members 
should be, albeit specific attention in the law is dedicated to beneficiaries and 
workers. In general, it is the social enterprise, through the Assembly, that has the 
right to identify classes of stakeholders. 5 The multi-stakeholder social enterprise 
(MSSE) can include stakeholders as organisational members or as board 
members. Through these bodies, stakeholders can contribute to strategic 
decision-making, including what to produce, and how to distribute economic 
surplus under the limited distribution constraint. As Borzaga and Mittone (1997) 
notice, this participative form of governance (paired with a social aim and a non-
profit distribution constrain) leads to a unique feature, which is that the 
activities of the organisation have multiple categories of beneficiaries, including 
members but also non-members.  
This principle was already recognised in 1991 and it had been partly 
implemented. Even before the 2006 law that instituted a “non-discrimination 
principle” in relation to stakeholder admission practices, in many instances 
social cooperatives had put in place solutions for the representation of multiple 
                                                        
5 Similar requirements were introduced in other countries. However, while Italy 
introduced a ‘non discrimination principle’ in the selection of members, France 
has been the only European country where multistakeholding became a specific 
requirement. The SCIC (Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Collectif) specifies the 
three types of members that must be represented in the board: workers and 
beneficiaries, plus a third category to be nominated. In France moreover (unlike 
Italy where the legislator pursued the idea of independence of SE from the public 
sector) public administrations can also be members of a social enterprise. 
 
interests and needs in the form of committees representing beneficiaries or their 
families (Cafaggi and Iamiceli, 2009). 
Despite encouraging pluralism, the 2006 legislation activated other business 
forms only to a limited extent. Today, the majority of Italian social enterprises is 
still defined by the social cooperation model, to an extent that the two categories 
nearly overlap. Workers still remain the main stakeholder to be represented in 
Italian social cooperatives, but their representation is not exclusive. Borzaga et 
al. (2011) have undertaken some research to map the governance status of these 
organisations. They evidence that nearly 80 percent of enterprises providing 
personal, social and work integration services feature some form of multiple 
stakeholder involvement.  Specifically, one out of three social cooperatives (34 
percent) are multi-stakeholder, although users are included in the membership 
in one out of ten social cooperatives. 29 percent are hybrid organisations with 
multiple membership but with a single stakeholder (workers) represented in the 
board of directors. 16% percent have a dual stakeholding (including workers 
and volunteers), whilst the remaining 21 percent are mono-stakeholder 
(workers) social cooperatives. Borzaga and Depedri (2014) have further noticed 
that users are members in the majority of Type B social cooperatives (across 
sectors, e.g. environmental maintenance, manufacturing), whilst Type A 
cooperatives (typically providing health assistance and educational services) 
tend not to involve users.  
 
Some research questions 
Several questions emerge out of this preliminary discussion that might usefully 
be the focus of further research: 
1. Is single-stakeholder governance more likely in highly commercial sectors 
where competitive pressures are high and market pricing is important? Is multi-
stakeholding more likely when the market pressures are lower and prices are set 
by negotiation with funding agencies such as local authorities? 
2. Is multi-stakeholder governance found in social care because it has these 
specific characteristics: contracts are long-term, service users find it difficult to 
assess the quality of the product, and the product itself is dependent on the 
relationship between service provider and user?  
3. Is it possible to operate a multi-stakeholder governance without bringing 
more than one stakeholder into ownership? In other words, is ownership less 
important than we might think?  
4. Is it possible in co-operatives that focus mainly on the needs of one owner – 
producer or consumer – to broaden their governance to include other 
stakeholders? If so, will this provide a business advantage, or will it lead to a loss 
of focus and higher governance costs compared to those of competitors? 
5. In some countries (England and Wales for instance) the health and social care 
sectors are becoming increasingly commercial, with new agencies being formed 
to bid for contracts. Some are multi-stakeholding (mainly workers, service 
users), some single (usually the workers). In this scenario, which type can we 
expect to have more success? 
6. What are the factors that can lower the internal costs of multi-stakeholding 
and increase a culture of stakeholder inclusion among directors? 
7. Within the multi-stakeholder organisation, what factors contribute to ensure 
the engagement of stakeholders in collective action? 
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